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INTRODUCTION
By international standards, Southeast Asia has 
done remarkably well in both economic growth 
and poverty reduction. The region’s economic 
growth rate during the past 25 years averaged about 
5.0% per year, while the corresponding figures for 
Asia and the world were about 3.9% and 2.6%, 
respectively. The growth accompanied a historic 
rapid poverty reduction, especially in Indonesia, 
1   Revised version of the paper was presented at the Expert Group Meeting on Rural Development and Rural Poverty Reduction 
(organized by ESCAP), held in Bangkok, Thailand on 19–20 May 2005.
    
ABSTRACT
Economic growth among Southeast Asian countries during the last 25 years has averaged at five 
percent per year and has been accompanied by a decline in the relative importance of agriculture in the 
national output and employment. The response of poverty to this growth and structural transformation 
has been equally remarkable, with the headcount ratio in 2002 registering a more than 50 percent 
drop from the 1990 figure. 
Although impressive, Southeast Asia’s overall record in growth and poverty reduction has not 
been uniform, as evident in the experiences of countries like Indonesia, Philippines and East Timor, 
as well as the transition economies, namely, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. In these 
countries, liberalizing agricultural trade, combined with public investment in productivity-enhancing 
support services, would advance the interests of the poor. To contribute in the efforts to strengthen the 
continuing war on poverty especially in these transition economies, the paper highlights the lessons 
learned in poverty reduction so as to identify more clearly the policy options for achieving the Millenium 
Development Goals in the Region.
One powerful lesson that has emerged in tackling poverty and food insecurity  concerns the use 
of policy, investment and institutional reforms to enable the rural poor to partake of the windfall from 
efficient domestic markets and the improved access to technology, infrastructure and education.  The 
success stories would show that the main push to these efficiency-enhancing reforms has come, not 
from globalization nor agricultural policy but from the internal realization that the country and its 
citizens were the major beneficiaries of the reform.  Another important challenge facing countries 
in the Region is to find the appropriate mix of policies and institutions that would maximize the 
enormous benefits from globalization while protecting against its risks and pitfalls. Lastly, given that 
the investment requirements for poverty reduction are beyond the resources of low-income countries, 
the paper identifies the critical role of the development assistance community. 
Rural Poverty in Southeast Asia:  
Issues, Policies, and Challenges  
Arsenio M. Balisacan
Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture
Email: ambalisacan@agri.searca.org 
Rosemarie G. Edillon 
Asia-Pacific Policy Center, Philippines
Email: rgedillon@appc-ph.com
Sharon Faye A. Piza
Asia-Pacific Policy Center, Philippines
Email: sfpiza@skyinet.net26 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. While the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s adversely 
affected the welfare of the region’s population, 
Southeast Asia’s achievements in economic and 
human development during the past quarter-century 
remain impressive, especially when seen against the 
performance of South Asia.
These achievements, however, have not been 
uniform across countries in the region. While 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have posted 
rapid economic growth and are well on their way 
to achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), the same cannot be said for Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, and the Philippines whose 
growth rates of output were comparatively low, and 
those of population, high. Even within countries, 
the diversity of performance in growth and poverty 
reduction is very evident (Balisacan 2004; Balisacan 
and Fuwa 2004). Sub-national studies suggest that 
the nature of growth, not just its speed, matters to 
poverty reduction. They also suggest considerable 
heterogeneity in impacts across households with 
different characteristics, including location, at any 
given level of income (Ravallion 2004). 
As is the case in developing regions of the 
world, nearly three-fourths of the poor in Southeast 
Asia live in rural areas; the majority are dependent 
on agriculture. Agricultural and rural development 
is thus key to achieving broad-based growth and 
the MDGs. 
In this paper, we distill the lessons learned in 
poverty reduction efforts in Southeast Asia and 
beyond, and examine the issues and challenges 
for the continuing war on poverty in the region, 
especially in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam (hereafter collectively referred to as 
CLMV). The aim is to contribute to understanding 
the policy options for achieving the MDGs in the 
region.
 
MDGS AND RURAL POVERTY 
It is unfortunate that the MDGs’ target 
indicators are not broken down into urban and 
rural sectors. If this had been the case, it would 
have become evident that the MDGs lean more 
heavily toward the rural sector. In the following, 
we highlight this disparate statistics by covering 
four countries for which such disaggregation is 
available, namely: Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and Cambodia. These countries account for about 
72% of Southeast Asia’s total population and 
roughly 50% of the poor (based on a poverty line 
of US$1 a day).
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
As noted above, over 70% of the poor people 
are in rural areas. In Vietnam and Cambodia, 
almost all the poor (90%) are found in rural areas.2 
The number of Indonesia’s poor in urban areas 
declined from 20% in 1987 to 14% in 2002, while 
rural poverty decreased from 45% in 1984 to 21% 
in 2002. In the case of the Philippines, rural poverty 
decreased from 53% in 1988 to 47% in 2000. Table 
1 shows the data for other countries in the region.
One of the most obvious expressions of poverty 
is malnutrition. Persistent malnutrition diminishes 
poverty alleviation efforts by limiting human 
capital accumulation, hampering labor productivity 
growth, and generating welfare losses to society 
through later adult disability, chronic disease, and 
early mortality. It most adversely affects women 
and children of poor households in rural areas. In 
1990, 36% of pre-school children in Southeast Asia 
were malnourished; this figure was slightly reduced 
to 29% in 2000. 
Specifically, in Cambodia, 33% of children 
under age five in rural areas are moderately 
underweight and 13% are severely underweight. 
In rural areas, 22% of women aged 15–49 suffer 
from malnutrition. 
Goal 2:  Achieve universal education
Participation rate, even in primary education, 
is disproportionately lower in rural areas than in 
urban areas.  In the Philippines, the participation 
rate among 6-10 years old is about 88% in urban 
areas and only 78% in rural areas. 
  2 Estimates are based on figures from the ADB Key 
Indicators 2004. Note that the definition of a “rural” (or 
an “urban”) area varies widely across countries. The 
usual practice is to first characterize an urban sector, and 
then take the rural sector as the complement, that is, the 
non-urban areas. Some countries require a substantial 
percentage of the labor force to be employed in agriculture 
for a locality to be classified as rural. Thus, a rural area has 
often become synonymous with an agricultural area.27 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Rosemarie G. Edillon, and Sharon Faye Piza
Goal 3:  Promote gender equality and empower 
women 
In the region, the proportion of women aged 
15-49 who had completed at least the fifth grade is 
lower in rural than in urban areas. In the Philippines, 
where “completion rates” are high, only 86% of 
women in rural areas completed the fifth grade, 
in contrast to 96% of women in urban areas. In 
Cambodia, where the figures are generally low, 
only 27% of women in rural areas completed the 
fifth grade, while the corresponding figure for urban 
areas is 56%.
Goal 4:  Reduce child mortality
In the countries that we considered, mortality 
ranges from 30 per thousand among Vietnamese 
children under age five to a high of 93 per thousand 
among Cambodian children in urban areas. This 
is a disturbing figure but doubtless better than the 
corresponding figure for Cambodia’s rural areas, 
which is recorded at 126 per thousand children.
Goal 5:  Improve maternal health  
Only 34% of pregnant women in rural areas in 
Cambodia get to see medically trained personnel at 
least once during their term, compared with 62% 
of pregnant women in urban areas. We observe 
better maternal practices among pregnant women 
in Indonesia. In rural areas, 88% of them visit 
medically trained personnel at least once during 
their term; 98% of their urban counterparts are 
able to do so.
Goal 6:  Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other 
diseases
The best approach to achieve this goal is to put 
in place preventive measures. An example would be 
the ownership and use of a bednet. An average of 
80% of rural households in Cambodia have at least 
one bednet; the figure for the urban areas is slightly 
higher at 88%.   Another indicator worth looking at 
is how knowledgeable people are in avoiding the 
transmission of HIV.  In the region, Cambodia has 
the highest prevalence, with almost 2% among their 
females aged 15-24 infected with HIV. This may 
be due to the fact that only 33% of the females of 
reproductive age in rural areas know of at least one 
way of avoiding sexually transmitted diseases.
Goal 7:  Ensure environmental sustainability
UNDP  (1998)  reports  that  out  of  the   
2.7  million  premature  deaths  caused  by 
environmental degradation, more than 1.8 million 
deaths occur among the rural poor households, 
which are exposed to indoor air pollution.  
Simply put, the chances of the countries in 
the region meeting the MDGs largely depend 
on the success of rural development. In fact, it 
is only appropriate that global partnership will 
Table 1.  Poverty in Southeast Asia
 
        Poverty incidence (%) using national poverty line
  Country          Contribution 
      Total  Urban  Rural  of rural poverty 
            to total povertya
 
Cambodia  (1999)  35.9  18.2  40.1  93.8
Indonesia  (2002)  18.2  14.5  21.1  70.3
Lao PDR  (1997)  38.6  26.9  41.0  80.7
Malaysia  (1999)  7.5  3.4  12.4  69.3
Myanmar  (1997)  22.9  23.9  22.4  70.4
Philippines  (2000)  34.0  20.4  47.4  72.4
Thailand  (2002)  9.8  4.0  12.6  91.3
Vietnam  (2002)  28.9  6.6  35.6  92.3
  a Author’s estimates.
    Source: ADB, Key Indicators 2004.28 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2
primarily concentrate more on rural development.   
However, even if we agree on the primacy of 
rural development, the modalities of multilateral 
partnership, in particular, can be highly contentious.   
We only need to be reminded of the difficulties 
in defining minimum agreements regarding 
agricultural trade liberalization and the even greater 
problem of ensuring compliance. 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION  
AND THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM
The total output of the region increased by 
more than threefold between 1980 and 2000 
(expressed in US$ 2000). There are, however, 
substantial inter-country variations, particularly 
with respect to per capita incomes (Figure 1). The 
top performers, whose per capita incomes more 
than doubled are Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia. Among the transition economies, 
Lao PDR and especially Vietnam, exhibited very 
impressive growth rates but the absolute levels are 
still low. While per capita income increased almost 
threefold in Vietnam, it virtually stagnated in the 
Philippines. Trailing far behind though, both in 
absolute level and growth rate, is Cambodia, where 
per capita income in 2003 was only about 90% of 
its level in 1980.
Economic growth among the countries in 
Southeast Asia, as in other countries, has been 
accompanied by structural transformation. With 
the exception of Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, 
where agriculture is a relatively small component 
of the local economy, the share of agriculture in 
national output has also declined quite sharply 
during the past two decades, especially in the 
original members of the ASEAN (Table 2). For 
the transition economies, agriculture still accounts 
from about one-fourth (Vietnam) and one-third 
(Cambodia) to nearly one-half (Lao PDR and 
Myanmar) of total output.
That agriculture declines in relative importance 
as per capita income increases is an empirical 
regularity (Chenery and Syrquin 1975; Oshima 1987; 
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman 2005). Agriculture 
share tends not only to have a negative relationship 
with per capita GDP and total foreign trade, but 
also to be greater (in absolute values) in countries 
with an agricultural economy growing slower than 
the rest of the economy. The development process 
could also bring about absolute declines in the 
number of farm workers.
As further discussed below, the pattern of 
agricultural growth and the relative importance 
of agriculture in the economy reflect not only a 
long-term structural phenomenon but also the 
influence of government policies and strategies on 
the sector and the overall economy. The latter factor 
comes about partly in response to an “agricultural 
problem” resulting from disequilibria brought about 
Fig. 1. Per capita GDP, 1993 and 2002.29 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Rosemarie G. Edillon, and Sharon Faye Piza
by disparate growth experiences of the agriculture 
and non-agriculture sectors as countries go through 
the different development stages.
Hayami  and  Godo  (2004)  describe  the 
agricultural problem as “the problem of an 
overriding concern of policymakers with respect to 
designing and implementing policies for agriculture 
as part of policies to promote national economies 
in their own countries.” Following Schultz (1953), 
they refer to the agricultural problem faced by the 
low-income countries as the “food problem.” The 
problem arises because, in these countries, which 
typically have rapid population growth and high 
food demand elasticity, the growth of food demand 
outpaces the growth of food supply. The resulting 
high food prices pull up the cost of living, thereby 
putting upward pressure on the wages of non-farm 
workers. Increases in wages, if not supported by 
increases in productivity, erode the competitiveness 
of the non-farm sector (as well as the farm sector), 
thereby suppressing industrialization, employment 
generation, and economic growth. Simply put, 
the basic problem is that of supplying food at low 
prices, especially to urban workers.  In practice, this 
has meant government procurement of farm outputs 
at lower-than-market prices, or accepting food aid 
from developed countries for local distribution to 
non-farm workers at the expense of farmers.
In contrast, Hayami and Godo (2004) refer 
to the agricultural problem faced by high-income 
countries as the “protection problem.” The problem 
has to do with food demand growing more slowly 
than food supply. The growth in the demand for 
food is very slow because of the low population 
growth and the saturation of food consumption. 
Meanwhile, the food supply increases at a fast 
rate mostly because of the high rate of investment 
in agricultural supply, particularly research. This 
wedge between low demand and high supply tends 
to pull down prices and farm incomes, thereby 
driving resources out of agriculture. In reality, 
however, the reallocation of resources takes time; 
therefore, government implements protection 
policies to mitigate the social cost of adjustment. 
Moreover, powerful farm lobbies put pressure 
on government to provide measures aimed at 
preventing farm incomes from substantially falling 
relative to non-farm incomes.
An even more complicated picture is the 
agricultural problem of middle-income countries. 
Their governments must balance two political 
objectives: (1) secure cheap food for urban workers, 
and (2) prevent farmers’ incomes from falling below 
that of urban workers. Hayami and Godo (2004) 
label this as the “disparity problem.” We note that 
these two objectives require contrasting solutions. 
While these may be addressed simultaneously, 
governments can only do so at the expense of fiscal 
resources and the economy as a whole. This is 
exemplified in the case of governments conferring 
subsidies to both consumers and producers of food. 
The sheer size of the agriculture sector in relation to 
the overall economy, as well as the urban population 
in relation to the total population, at this stage of 
   Table 2.  Share of sectoral outputs to total output
 
     Agriculture      Industry        Services
   1980  1990  2002  1980  1990  2002    1980  1990  2002
Indonesia  24.8  19.4  17.5  43.4  39.1  44.5    31.8  41.5  38.1
Malaysia  21.2  15.2  9.5    43.8  42.2  48.2    35.2  44.2  45.6
Philippines  25.1  21.9  14.7    38.8  34.5  32.5    36.1  43.6  52.8
Singapore  1.2  0.3  0.1    38.0  33.1  33.6    64.7  67.8  66.6
Thailand  23.2  12.5  9.0    28.7  31.1  37.0    48.1  43.0  46.5
Brunei   0.6  2.4  3.5    84.8  54.8  41.8    15.1  45.0  53.2
Vietnam  43.0  38.7  24.6    23.3  22.7  35.9    33.7  38.6  39.5
Lao PDR  55.3  60.7  49.9    17.2  14.4  24.5    34.6  25.0  23.5
Myanmar  46.5  57.3  49.7    12.7  10.5  10.3    40.8  32.2  31.0
Cambodia  39.5  50.9  34.7    10.1  11.9  23.8    46.0  38.8  34.5
   Source: United Nations Statistical Division.30 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2
development suggests that conferring subsidies 
to both groups have potentially high economic 
costs.
POVERTY AND INSECURITY 
DURING GROWTH
As noted earlier, by international standards, 
Southeast Asia’s economic growth during the 
past 20 years has been quite impressive. The 
response of poverty to this growth and structural 
transformation has been equally remarkable. Using 
the international poverty line of US$1 a day per 
capita, ADB (2004) reports that Southeast Asia’s 
headcount ratio registered only 10% in 2002, 
representing a more than 50% drop from the figure 
in 1990 (the benchmark year for the MDGs).3  The 
region has already met its MDG target, more than 
a decade before the deadline. Contributing to the 
dramatic decline were Vietnam (from 51% to 13%) 
and Indonesia (20% to 7%). The slowest reduction 
of poverty was in the Philippines. The poverty 
incidence was 15% in 2002, reflecting a meager 
improvement from the 1990 level of 20%.
We can safely assume that, in the midst of 
opportunities to improve living standards offered 
by economic growth, the remaining poor are the 
ones seriously lacking in capabilities, or altogether 
separated from the rest of the economy. This 
incapability or isolation may be the main problem 
of rural poverty. 
Edillon et al. (2004) surveyed the poorest of 
the poor families residing in rural Philippines, and 
gleaned the following profile:
•  Access conditions are very poor to nonexistent. 
These pertain to access to information, 
technology, markets, services, and centers 
of governance. In one area, the fare going to 
the town center is equivalent to the average 
monthly expenditure of a family.
•  The assets the poor command are of very low 
quality and land tenure is not secure. Very few 
own the lands they till and the houses they 
live in. Only about 40% of agricultural lands 
are in the plains. Only 20% of the rice lands 
are irrigated. The quality of labor supply is 
very low. Average educational attainment of 
employed members is only 43% of expected, 
given their age.
•  Social capital is very rudimentary.
•  There is very little evidence of empowerment, 
whether economic or political, even among 
the political leaders in the barangay (smallest 
political/administrative unit in the Philippines). 
They do not have mechanisms to exact 
accountability from government officials. 
Participation in development activities is token, 
at best, limited only to attending the barangay 
assemblies. For instance, they are not aware 
of the income and expense accounts of their 
barangay even though these are reported 
during the barangay assemblies.
On a larger scale, Narayan et al. (2000) 
conducted a participatory action research to delve 
deeper into the social dimensions of poverty. 
While the poor highlight hunger and other 
material deprivations, they also “speak forcefully 
of social, physical and psychological dimensions, 
and of lacking freedom of choice and action.” A 
poor woman from Latvia remarked, “Poverty is 
humiliation, the sense of being dependent, and 
of being forced to accept rudeness, insults, and 
indifference when we seek help.” 
The authors describe the situation faced by the 
poor in 10 dimensions, as follows:
 
•  They look hungry, exhausted, and sick. 
•  They lack capabilities due to their lack of 
education, information, and skills. They also 
lack confidence.  
•  They live in isolated, risky, and unserviced 
places. If in urban areas, these would be in 
stigmatized sections.  
•  They have weak organizations, if at all, and 
these are most probably not connected to any 
higher-level or apex organizations. 
•  Their sources of livelihood are precarious, 
seasonal, and inadequate. The same goes for 
the assets they possess, if any.  
•  The gender relations can be described as 
troubled and unequal. There is usually discord 
between the spouses of families where the 
women earn more than the men.  
3 The countries included are Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.31 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Rosemarie G. Edillon, and Sharon Faye Piza
•  The poor are usually taken for granted, if not 
abused, by the more powerful.
•  Outside their familiar circles, the poor are 
isolated and discriminated.  
•  They generally find institutions meant to serve 
them as disempowering and excluding.  
•  They lack protection and peace of mind.  
Poverty feeding into indignity leads to loss 
of self-worth and more severe poverty. This cycle 
needs to be stopped. 
The underlying premise of the MDGs is still the 
concept of human development. We note that none of 
the MDGs concentrate on economic growth; rather, 
the goals focus on the distribution of capabilities 
– income, health and nutrition, education, gender 
relations, and physical environment. Still, we 
recognize that meeting MDG1 — eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger — is key to meeting 
the other goals. The usual prescriptions for 
poverty reduction are not entirely independent of 
the principle of development, particularly when 
the second strategy is spelled out: (1) sustained 
economic growth, (2) improved linkages between 
the growing sectors and the lagging sectors, and (3) 
reduced vulnerabilities of those who will graduate 
out of poverty.
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) adopted a 
slightly different concept of development, almost 
similar to utilitarian theories. They assumed that the 
objective of society is to maximize national welfare, 
say W. W is expressed as a utility function with 
determinants: GDP per capita (y), average income 
of the poorest quintile (y1), environmental quality 
(E), and a measure of the volatility or unexpected 
shocks (v). W increases with y, y1, and E and 
decreases with v. The question they tried to resolve 
was how best to maximize national welfare – via 
agricultural or non-agricultural growth.
They began by estimating the marginal impact 
of agriculture vs. non-agriculture growth on each of 
the determinants of W. The result showed that the 
effect varied with the income level of the country. 
There was a positive causal effect running from 
agriculture to non-agriculture output in developing 
countries. But this turned negative for developed 
countries. An interesting result showed that while 
agricultural labor productivity had a significant 
effect on the average income of the poorest 
quintile, this was smaller than the impact of non-
agricultural output per worker. The result with 
respect to environmental quality was mixed. The 
non-agriculture sector was the main determinant of 
CO2 emissions, but the agriculture sector was the 
main source of deforestation.  
Meanwhile, data showed that agriculture output 
was more volatile than non-agriculture output. 
Bravo-Ortega and Lederman (2005) found that the 
volatility-reducing effect of the non-agriculture 
sector increased with the level of income, while that 
of agriculture exhibited the opposite pattern.  
Combining the findings on each of the 
determinants of overall welfare and using two 
weight scenarios (1- equal weights, and 2- GDP 
per capita gets 40% weight), they concluded that 
the national welfare in high-income countries is 
best served through non-agricultural growth. In 
developing countries, welfare is also best served by 
non-agricultural growth, although the contribution 
of agriculture is positive and relatively larger than 
its share in GDP.  
At present, we observe that the focus of 
development efforts is shifting to developing the 
rural non-farm sector, with the hope that this shift 
will catalyze the development of the farm sector. 
Ravallion (2002) adopts the same distinction in his 
study of the externalities in rural development in 
China.  First, there is the so-called “own effects”, 
where the level of economic activity in a given 
sector positively affects the growth of income from 
that source. Next, there are “cross effects” where 
farm output positively impacts on the output of 
forestry, animal husbandry, and fishing that, in turn, 
positively affects handicrafts, industry, processing, 
and transportation. Thus, rural development 
generates externalities.  
On the other hand, there is hardly any sign of 
reverse linkages. If anything, there are indications 
of negative external effects from some non-farm 
activities on farm output.
Islam (1997) enumerates the sources of demand 
for goods and services produced by the rural non-
farm sector. The various demands consist of the 
demand for consumer goods by farm households, 
their demand for productions and inputs to be used 
in agriculture, and the demand for consumer goods 
and processed agricultural goods by the urban 
sector. He warns that improving access between 
the rural non-farm sector and the urban sectors 
could have the perverse effect of disenfranchising 32 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 2, Nos. 1&2
the farm sector and some rural non-farm sectors. 
When both sectors are disenfranchised, competition 
comes in from the more efficient producers from the 
urban sector and the rest of the world. Inevitably, 
we may not observe any backward linkage going 
from urban to rural sectors. 
The resulting perverse effect of improved 
access on the poor also comes out in the model 
estimated by Balisacan and Pernia (2003), where 
quality-adjusted road density negatively affects the 
income of the poorest quintile. However, when the 
variable is interacted with education, the coefficient 
turns positive and significant. 
Ravallion and Datt (2002), meanwhile, 
find that better initial conditions increase the 
responsiveness of the poor to state-led anti-poverty 
programs. These initial conditions have to do with 
higher female literacy rate, lower infant mortality 
rate, and better distribution of land ownership. In 
effect, better capabilities could be a leverage for 
better poverty outcomes. 
PERSISTENT AND EMERGING ISSUES  
IN RURAL POVERTY REDUCTION
The  most  controversial  issues  said  to 
significantly affect the poor are globalization, 
applications of modern science in agriculture 
(biotechnology), and environmental degradation. 
Closely related to globalization are the recent 
accession of China to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the emergence of India as an economic 
powerhouse. In this section, we examine the 
constraints to, and opportunities for, advancing 
rural poverty reduction in Southeast Asia given 
these developments.
Globalization
Conventional wisdom tells us that if we assume 
the rural poor to consist mostly of subsistence 
farmers, then, by character, they are insulated 
from the risks associated with globalization, to 
wit: structural transformation, volatility of prices, 
and contagion of crisis effects (Clarete 2002). 
However, this can only mean that they do not share 
in the benefits of globalization. We may then see 
a worsening of income inequality between those 
who participate in market transactions and those 
who are isolated from the market.
Dollar and Kraay (2004), however, did not find 
any systematic relationship between changes in 
trade volumes (a proxy for openness) and changes 
in household income inequality. They based their 
conclusions on the economic performance and 
the poverty reduction experience of post-1980 
globalizers. The increased openness to trade 
coincided with faster growth rates of their economy, 
even as growth in the rich countries and in the 
other developing countries has declined. These 
two results can only mean that absolute poverty 
has fallen sharply. 
For example, Vietnam (although it has been 
excluded from the econometric estimation) has seen 
its poverty incidence dropping by about half in only 
a period of 10 years: from 75% in 1988 to 37% in 
1998. The period in between was when Vietnam 
opened its markets to the rest of the world. Most 
notable is the rise in its export of rice and other 
labor-intensive products.
Ravallion (2004) cautions us against making 
conclusions based on average or aggregate results. 
Using Morocco as one case study, he finds that since 
the majority of Morocco’s poor are net consumers, 
the overall result is that they gain from the reduction 
in domestic prices brought about by the trade reform 
on cereals. However, most of the rural poor are net 
producers; thus, the increased openness to trade also 
increases rural poverty. Focusing on a panel data 
of households in China, he finds that the generally 
positive gains from globalization among urban 
households tend to fall slightly as income rises. 
Unfortunately, the impacts on rural households 
are, in general, negative and worst among the very 
poorest. 
Economic Boom in China and India,  
and China’s Accession to WTO 
Taken together, India and China make up 
almost 40% of the world’s population and produce 
6% of the world’s output. These are two very large 
markets. We can safely assume that with greater 
integration their economic performance would have 
externalities—good and bad—on the rest of Asia 
and the world.
For the more advanced economies in Southeast 
Asia, notably Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Thailand, the rapid economic expansion in both 
China and India is likely to be a boon. But for their 33 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Rosemarie G. Edillon, and Sharon Faye Piza
less-advanced neighbors, notably the transition 
countries, as well as Philippines and Indonesia, it is 
likely to be a bane, at least initially since unskilled 
labor, which fuels their production processes, 
are far more abundant and cheap in the two giant 
economies. It takes, however, more than cheap 
and abundant labor to gain competitive advantage. 
The economic climate, particularly infrastructure 
and the rules-of-the-game, is an equally crucial 
determinant of investment and competitiveness. 
The smaller, less-advanced countries of the region 
can seize the opportunity for domestic growth 
brought about by the economic boom in the two 
giants by putting in place efficiency-enhancing 
reforms in both policy and governance. 
A bigger concern, though not articulated in 
official circles, is the political stand of China 
regarding issues that could affect security in 
Southeast Asia. The more prominent issues concern 
the boundary dispute over the Spratlys, and its 
attitude towards Taiwan and North Korea. There 
is also concern that resentment over the worsening 
income inequality in China could lead to massive 
unrest, as it did in 1989. An economic downturn 
in China could easily lead to an internal upheaval. 
The contagion effects are still uncertain, but 
what worries the neighbors more is the political 
implication as China tries to maintain party control 
and probably re-institute authoritarian rule. 
Environmental Degradation
Another major problem that is waiting to 
confront the poor is the degradation of the 
environment. We are not just talking of physical 
disasters, though their effects are indeed catastrophic. 
Rather, we refer to renewable and non-renewable 
resources that form the natural capital of the poor. 
Lopez (1997) emphasizes that the degradation of 
the natural capital is likely to be devastating for the 
poor who, generally having little human capital, 
continue to depend on natural capital for their 
income. Because the poor have few possibilities 
for substituting other assets for natural resources, 
the degradation of these resources (e.g., water, soil 
fertility, etc.) could lead to irreversible vicious 
circles of poverty and environmental destruction. 
Likewise,  numerous  disruptions  in  the 
agricultural market have occurred owing to animal 
diseases like the avian flu4, foot-and-mouth disease 
(mostly in China and Korea), mad cow (isolated 
cases in Japan since 2001), etc. Outbreaks, or even 
just reports of incidence, of these diseases can cause 
commodity demand to drop sharply. The effect can 
be nothing but harmful to agricultural producers, 
most of whom are the poor. 
Biotechnology can potentially address these 
problems. As history demonstrates, science and 
technology, when applied wisely and well, can be 
a very effective tool for eradicating the worst forms 
of poverty.
In the environmental sector, biotechnology 
may arrest the depletion of resources by introducing 
varieties that make efficient use of the resource 
(e.g., rice varieties that are not too “water loving”). 
Another possibility is to extend the use of the 
resource, say water, through recycling as is being 
practiced now in California. David (2004) also 
recommends the use of mechanical methods to fast-
track reforestation, and agro-forestation to maintain 
the watersheds and recharge the aquifers.
Similarly,  in  the  agriculture  sector, 
biotechnology can be used to improve crop-animal 
resistance to diseases. For example, World Bank 
(2000) makes special mention of a vaccine that 
eliminated rinderpest, one of the deadliest animal 
diseases. In the crop sciences, the trend now is 
developing varieties that are resistant to pests and 
diseases. 
The challenge for science and technology, 
however, is double-edged: how to increase food 
production and thus ensure food security, and 
increase farm income, while at the same time 
conserving the natural resources. The other big 
issues concern the acceptability to consumers, and 
the effects on food safety. There have been some 
attempts to present biotech products as though 
developed from alien materials that have unknown 
properties. Clearly, there is an imperative need for 
serious, open-minded, and scientific discussions 
of facts, as well as further research, testing and 
validation procedures. This can only be done after 
contending parties agree that biotechnology, indeed, 
offers a solution to the problems of the poor. 
4 There were reported outbreaks in Thailand, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Cambodia during the first quarter of 
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IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES  
FOR GOVERNMENTS  
AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
In the past, according to economist John Stuart 
Mill (1848), the government’s principal functions 
were to raise revenues to provide public goods, 
set the legal framework to govern property and 
contracts, and enforce the laws (judicature and 
police systems). While the goals of public policy 
largely remain the same (growth and stabilization, 
efficiency, and equity), the instruments have evolved. 
The changes emanated from the increasingly 
complex and sophisticated transactions, and the 
widening influence of consumption and production 
processes. The complicated conditions are bound 
to multiply as globalization proceeds.
Rural Development  
Deserves Government Priority
We began this paper by emphasizing the 
importance of rural development in meeting the 
MDGs5.  More than the goal to fulfill international 
commitments, one of the primary functions of 
government is to promote equity. In addition, as 
Ravallion (2002) indicated, there are externalities 
to rural development. If we leave this to the 
private sector, it is likely that there will be under-
investment, thereby giving the government with all 
the more reason to step in.
Lessons in Development From the 1990s
The East Asian financial crisis revealed that 
while rapid and sustained growth is possible and 
can even lead to significant reduction in poverty, 
these are by no means ensured. And mistakes can 
be costly, as was the case in Indonesia. 
Thomas et al. (2000) contends that the 
1990s provided the following lessons regarding 
development, namely: (1) investments in people 
need to be concerned with the quality and 
distribution of those investments; (2) rapid growth, 
while it supports social development when broad-
based, can hurt environmental sustainability in the 
absence of appropriate actions; (3) while market 
openness and competition continue to provide 
benefits, the financial risks must be managed with 
attention to country-specific factors; and (4) good 
governance and institutional factors should be 
given priority and not postponed for later stages 
of reform.
The  recommendation,  therefore,  is  for 
planners to adopt a multi-dimensional approach 
to development and national welfare. For rural 
development to proceed, it is essential to keep in 
mind that income growth is not all that matters to 
national welfare.
Empower the rural poor.  Being empowered 
refers to the capability to be of use to society. 
It means having not only the potential and the 
willingness to harness these capabilities, but 
also the opportunity and the means to put these 
capabilities in action.
The first thing that we need to do is to improve 
the quality of human capital in the rural areas. We 
should give to adult education and skills training 
the same degree of importance and resources that 
we invest on basic education. Functional literacy 
is no longer adequate to be able to compete in the 
modern-day labor markets.
We also need to increase the coverage and 
provision of public health service in the rural areas. 
We need to universally promote immunization of 
children to ensure a healthier generation, and thereby 
reduce (if not eliminate) the potential sources 
of vulnerability of poor families, particularly of 
children getting ill.
We must aim at educating rural families about 
family planning methods and reproductive health. 
Rural families tend to be larger than urban families. 
While they may regard additional children as 
additional labor supply, they fail to factor in the 
time lag between the birth of a child and the time 
when he can be useful as a  farmhand. This time 
lag is rather long and requires a large amount of 
resources. Oftentimes, these resources come at the 
expense of other crucial factors like the education 
of the older child or the time spent by the mother 
in childrearing.
As we improve the human capital of the rural 
poor, we likewise need to improve the efficiency 
5   Although the targets will mostprobably be met, these will 
most likely be far from the goals. Note that while most of 
the goals are stated in absolute forms—like eradicate, 
achieve universal, empower, combat, ensure— the targets 
are expressed in relative terms, like reduce by half, reduce 
by two-thirds, reduce by three-quarters, based on a 
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of the other factors of production. We need to 
introduce, for example, new technologies, whether 
in the form of hybrid seeds, better farm techniques, 
etc. to the poor, in order to increase land and water 
productivity. We should teach them to diversify 
into other crops or to even spread their wings and 
explore non-farm activities. These will serve to 
increase their labor productivity. 
Next, we address the social dimension of 
poverty. We need to improve the sense of self-worth 
of the poor. One way is to break the dependence 
relations that exist, whether landlord-tenant, 
lender-borrower, patron-client, and the like. Das 
Gupta et al. (2003)  pointed to the potential of such 
government policies as land reform, tenancy reform, 
and income diversification to reduce serious power 
imbalances within communities, and hopefully, in 
the long run, dismantle dependence relationships. 
For instance, income diversification reduces 
vulnerabilities and minimizes the need to call on 
the landlord and usurers for help. In the Philippines, 
capability-building programs designed to transform 
farmers from a farmer-tenant into being a farmer-
manager accompany the land reform program. 
We  also  must  explore  other  pathways. 
Community-driven development (CDD) is one 
such alternative pathway. This consists of related 
projects which train communities to analyze their 
situation, propose solutions, prioritize project-
given resources, implement, maintain, and operate 
these projects. The thrust of such projects is not so 
much on the output accomplishment, with respect 
to projects undertaken, but on the processes being 
used. 
CDD projects typically begin with the organizer 
organizing the community apart from the existing 
political structure. Again, this design breaks down 
traditions of leader-follower relations and produces 
alternative leaders. CDD, subsequently, puts in 
place an accountability mechanism. Das Gupta et 
al. (2003) further writes that even if the poorest do 
not benefit directly from the new opportunities, they 
can enormously benefit indirectly from the social 
churning generated in the community.
Facilitate access to markets. An empowered 
rural sector can now be a significant market player. 
We acknowledge, however, that empowerment is a 
process and is perfected by practice. Here, we must 
take extra effort to making the legal environment 
governing property and contracts well known 
among the poor. They must be aware of their rights 
and legal recourse, should the need arise. 
Access to information is very crucial at this 
stage. Government can provide the service of 
regularly updating information on prices, supply, 
potential demand, etc. It is important that the 
rural communities know where and how to source 
the information, and that access is easy and 
inexpensive.
Access to technology is also equally important, 
especially on food processing, packaging, or even 
the knowledge of techniques that can prolong the 
shelf-life of their produce. This is the only way 
that the rural sector can serve the urban markets, 
let alone, the global market. Standards for safety 
have to be set. This will also instill discipline on 
the part of rural sector producers to improve the 
quality of their produce.
Better roads and transport system will facilitate 
the access; so will electrification and cyber-media 
projects.
Improve social security. As the rural poor 
participate in the market, they become exposed 
to the vagaries of the market. The frequency and 
intensity of market shocks may increase with 
globalization.
Earlier, we discussed the strategies being 
implemented by low-income and middle-income 
countries to solve their “agricultural problem.” 
There may be a timeline to this when developed 
countries finally succumb to pressure (from WTO 
and other multilateral bodies) to reduce its subsidies 
to agriculture. This could increase world prices and 
seriously affect those that have depended on cheap 
imports. The rise of China in the world market will 
increase competition in goods that utilize unskilled 
labor. 
For sure, there will be structural adjustments 
but these will certainly take time. What is needed 
is a social security system that can cushion these 
adjustment costs. Traditionally, social security 
systems have covered only those working in the 
formal sector. These may include a substantial 
portion of urban workers, but the rural sector is 
definitely left out. Thus, we need to include and 
increase the coverage of the rural sector. 
We also strongly recommend that we improve 
the social capital of the rural sector. The family and 
informal networks are the sources of social security 
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we can enhance these by expanding the network 
to enable it to accommodate a deeper risk pool. 
Heterogeneity of membership is also important 
to minimize covariant risks. The networks can be 
made more formal and structured. They should 
be accorded with legal recognition. It would be to 
the greater interest if such institutional and legal 
frameworks were to  govern the workings and 
dealings of these organizations.
What About the Role 
of Multilateral Organizations?
The main responsibility for poverty reduction 
rests with the poor countries themselves. There 
is nothing that will work to effectively win the 
war against poverty without the firm resolve of 
governments to put in place policies and institutions 
that will enhance the economic climate for broad-
based long-term growth and human development. 
But even this is not enough. The investment 
requirements for poverty reduction in low-income 
countries are far beyond their resources, even 
under condition of good governance.  According 
to the Millennium Project, the investment costs 
for achieving the MDGs in a typical low-income 
country is roughly $75 per capita in 2006, rising 
to approximately $140 in 2015 (in constant dollar 
terms). These sums represent almost one-third of 
the annual per capita incomes of the transition 
countries in Southeast Asia. 
Multilateral organizations can promote the 
adoption of “best practices” in poverty reduction, 
although these would have to be tailored to the 
actual conditions and environs of the poor. For 
instance, given its direct and indirect benefits, 
CDD holds promise for replication. There should 
be several forums where these endeavors are 
tracked and evaluated. CDD, by definition, is not 
like a technology that can be transferred.  Still, 
the experiences with respect to the use of certain 
modalities would find resonance in others similarly 
situated. But more than  the harvest of success 
stories and  rich lessons these would provide is the 
affirmation that solutions, like CDD, can be done.
Finally, we maintain that pursuing the 
traditional objectives of capacity-building for rural 
development, by way of agricultural modernization, 
should be maintained.  However, we need to modify 
the techniques, keeping in mind the factors of 
production being employed by the rural poor.  The 
goal is to increase the productivity of each of these 
factors and reduce vulnerabilities.
CONCLUSION
Southeast Asia’s achievements in economic 
growth and poverty reduction have been quite 
remarkable. These achievements, however, have 
not been uniform among the countries in the 
region. For a number of the countries, particularly 
the transition economies, as well as East Timor, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, the challenge to 
maintain the momentum in reducing poverty is 
enormous. 
For these countries, both domestic policies 
and institutions have constrained efficiency and 
raised the “cost of doing business” in rural areas, 
thereby blunting productivity growth and eroding 
competitiveness in the global marketplace. 
Liberalizing agricultural trade enhances the welfare 
of the poor, especially the landless workers and 
urban consumers, although the short-term cost to 
the sector in terms of reduced incomes and labor 
displacement may be quite substantial.
However, when this is combined with public 
investment in productivity-enhancing support 
services (particularly R&D and irrigation), 
agricultural trade liberalization is likely to be a 
win-win proposition.
In addressing today’s pressing issues vis-à-vis 
poverty and food insecurity, it is important not to 
lose sight of the key lessons on agricultural growth 
and development in Asia in the past half-century.
One such powerful lesson has to do with 
enabling the rural poor through policy, investment, 
and institutional reforms that enhance the efficiency 
of domestic markets and provide improved access 
to technology, infrastructure, and education. 
This enabling environment allows rural growth 
benefits to be broadly based, thereby enhancing 
overall nutrition, human capital development, and 
productivity and economic growth in the medium- 
to long-term. 
Almost invariably, the successful cases of rural 
development and poverty reduction have shown 
a tenacity in the pursuit of efficiency-enhancing 
reforms. The key driver to these reforms has been 
neither globalization nor agricultural policy in 
developed countries. Rather, it is, by and large, the 37 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Rosemarie G. Edillon, and Sharon Faye Piza
internal realization that reforms are for the benefit 
of the country and its citizens. 
Globalization has its downside risks, but it 
also offers potentially enormous benefits. Many 
developing-country-globalizers have shown that the 
benefits more than outweigh the costs; for example, 
the speed of poverty reduction is unprecedented in 
China, Vietnam, and India. The challenge for most 
countries in the region is to find the appropriate 
mix of policies and institutions needed to exploit 
the benefits, while being on guard for the downside 
risks.
Fortuitously for agriculture and the rural 
sector, the key policy and governance reforms 
— enhancing economic competition, investing in 
efficiency-enhancing infrastructure and support 
services, and enabling institutions to efficiently 
respond to changes in economic landscape 
— required for improved efficiency (increased 
productivity and income) are largely compatible 
with globalization as well. 
Finally, it should be noted that while the main 
responsibility for poverty reduction rests with the 
low-income countries themselves, the investment 
requirements for poverty reduction are far beyond 
their resources, even under condition of good 
governance. According to the Millennium Project, 
the investment costs for achieving the MDGs in 
a typical low-income country is roughly $75 per 
capita in 2006, rising to approximately $140 in 
2015 (in constant dollar terms). It is clear that the 
development assistance community has a crucial 
role to play in the war against poverty. 
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